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The UN Security Council […’ Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda,
the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
lawwould […’ contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and
maintenance of peace […’
[…’Decides hereby, having received the request of theGovernment of Rwanda (S/1994/1115),
to establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible
for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such vio-
lations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994 and to this end to adopt the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda annexed hereto […’
UN Security Council Resolution 955, S/RES/955 (1994) 8 November 1994
Introduction
By now there is a huge literature surrounding the events of the Rwandan genocide, its
genesis and its aftermath, to the extent that a historiography of the genocide has been
written which has identified various strands of approach to the topic – often at radical
variance from each other.1 The literature can be divided into various sub-genre categories;
those that detail the events of the genocide, those that seek to place the genocide in histor-
ical context and those that try to account for the genocide in more thorough sociological,
political or anthropological terms. A unifying feature of the field of literature at this point
is that the genocide itself is accepted as having been multi-factorial in its causality over
1 S. Strauss, ‘TheHistoriography of the RwandanGenocide’, inD. Stone (Ed.),TheHistoriography of Genocide,
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2008.
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both the long and short durée of history, and that this history was heavily conditioned by
complex networks of relations between Rwandan and other regional and global state and
non-state actors. The simple story of an outbreak of inexplicable atavistic ethnic murder
has been thoroughly debilitated through multiple contextualizations. For most political
or historical commentators on the genocide, its historical genesis and its aftermath, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (henceforth ICTR) processmerits little more
than passing comment, and often such comment has the derogatory flavour of ‘too little
too late’.2
Yet there is also by now an extensive literature surrounding the processes of the ICTR,
chiefly regarding the novelty of certain of the convictions, for example the first conviction
on an actual charge of genocide, the first international criminal conviction of a serving
head of government, the first conviction for rape as a crime of genocide, the likely effect
of the ICTR as a forerunner to the permanent International Criminal Court.3 The fact that
the ‘Statute’ (constitutional document) of the ICTR limits its remit to ‘the prosecution of
persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide
and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1
January 1994 and 31December 1994’ is certainly pertinent here, in that the time limitation
imposed is one which cuts out the consideration of contextual factors which form the bulk
of any more comprehensive historical or political analysis. Although such factors might
be regarded as providing a broad context, it is understandable that the ICTR, in an effort
to achieve timely provision of justice, would proceed on the basis that the broad context
had only remote relevance to the much narrower category of what would be considered
in court because of its specific evidential relationship to a precisely defined crime. This
reductive legalism, while perhaps operationally necessary, and while opening up the legal
process to standard legal critical attention in terms of the quality of justice produced, in
processes such as the ICTR creates a deep paradox. This paradox at times surfaces even
within the processes of the Tribunal itself, for example when in Prosecutor v. Kayishema
andRuzindana,4 the court recognizes a need to contextualize the conflict, but also recognizes
the extra-legality of doing so, leading to an uncomfortable compromise position:
2 See, for example, G. Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide, Hurst, London 1997.
3 C. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, Kluwer, The Hague/ London 1999;
S. Zappala, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003; S.
Darcy, Collective Responsibility and Accountability Under International Law, Transnational Publishers,
Arsdley (NY) 2007; C. de Than and E. Shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights, Sweet and
Maxwell, London 2003; L.J. van den Herik, The Contribution of the Rwanda Tribunal to the Development of
International Criminal Law,Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2005.
4 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, p. 21. See generally p. 21-29, ‘Historical Context of
the 1994 Events in Rwanda’.
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The Trial Chamber […’is of the opinion that an attempt to explain the causal
links between the history of Rwanda and the suffering endured by this nation
in 1994 is not appropriate in this forum and may be futile. It is impossible to
simplify all the ingredients that serve as a basis for killings on such a scale.
Therefore, the account presented below is a brief explanation of issues relating
to the division of ethnic groups in Rwanda, a brief history of Rwanda’s post-
independence era, including a look at the 1991 constitution, theArushaAccords,
and the creation of militias.5
The nature of the crimes and what the international community want to achieve by trying
them would seem to rule out the insulation of the legal process from the historical and
socio-political issues within which the trial is implicated, yet the paradox is that such
insulation is maintained in order for the trial process to function. There is no such opera-
tional reason for academic commentary to maintain such a stance, yet what is lacking is
a body of literature considering together the broad context of the genocide and the issue
of the ICTR and its processes. A notable exception is Mullins and Rothe’s Blood Power
and Bedlam: Violations of International Criminal Law in Post-Colonial Africa,6 which, in
an attempt to develop a criminology of state crimes, goes some way to a consideration of
the ICTR through the same (post-colonial) analytic categories as the genocide itself. A
second exception is the account by Kingsley Moghalu in Rwanda’s Genocide: The Politics
of Global Justice,7 which offers a fascinatingly detailed account of intertwined legal and
political issues in the setting up, ongoing operation and effects of the ICTR, without,
however, adopting an overall theoretical explanatory framework. Both of these works are
heavily (and understandably) biased towards a retrospective analytic approach.
This essay attempts to complement such work through suggesting that the differing ways
in which the future is tied to the key concept of ‘reconciliation’, which grounds both the
ICTR process and the Rwandan governmental efforts at post-conflict social repair, and of
course a vision of the future implies a version of the past, opens up a fruitful territory for
investigating certain aspects of the politics of global justice. The idea of ‘reconciliation’
that lies at the heart of the justification for the legal process is specifically political, indeed
might be regarded as having become in recent times ‘a regulative ideal in political discourse’,
in its unassailability constituting the ‘telos and closure’ of politics.8 It is certainly striking
5 Id., p. 21. See generally p. 21-29, ‘Historical Context of the 1994 Events in Rwanda’.
6 C.W. Mullins and D. Rothe, Blood, Power and Bedlam: Violations of International Criminal Law in Post-
Colonial Africa, Peter Lang, New York 2008.
7 K. Moghalu, Rwanda’s Genocide: The Politics of Global Justice, Macmillan, London 2005.
8 E. Christodoulidis and S. Veitch, ‘Introduction’, in S. Veitch (Ed.), Law and the Politics of Reconciliation,
Ashgate, Aldershot 2007.
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that the ideal of reconciliation is so strongly promoted in the context of a trial for genocide,
where the notion of reconciliation might seem not only alien but potentially unjustifiable;
if genocide is evil then could it ever be just to be reconciled with the perpetrators?9 It is
also striking that national reconciliation is also the acknowledged aim and goal of post-
conflict legal and social processes in Rwanda itself, once again raising the issue of ‘telos’
and ‘closure’. It is here, in the contrast between ‘reconciliations’ that this essay finds its
point of focus, bearing in mind this question of whether ‘reconciliation’ has come to con-
stitute an arch-politics. Having first laid out a brief context to the setting up of the ICTR,
this essay tries to identify the idea structure behind the idea of ‘reconciliation’ as it operates
as a feature of the ICTR process, and to contrast this with the idea structure of how
ostensibly the same concept of ‘reconciliation’ is brought into play in paradigmatic legal
and public policy processes in Rwanda itself. What emerges is that not only are these
‘reconciliations’ different, but they are conflicting. Reconciliation becomes recognizable
as a politically mobilized concept with attendant power struggles over its meaning and
significance, and which in the context of the ICTR provides a function of insulating ‘the
International community’ from more developed forms of practical responsibility under
the guise of a gesture of generosity and justice.
Context to the Establishment of the ICTR
The most authoritative rendering of the truth is possible only through the
crucible of a trial that accords full due process. Such trials can generate a
comprehensive record of the nature and extent of the violations, how theywere
planned and executed, the fate of individual victims, who gave the orders and
who carried them out…When the world community fails to prevent genocide
fromoccurring, it should as least seek to ensure the prosecution of the allegedly
responsible individuals in an institution that is fair and is seen as fair. In this
regard, the Rwanda Tribunal serves as the conscience of the international
community. It is the manifestation of the moral outrage of humanity over the
transgressions of civilizational norms and ethics.
Statement of Malaysia, U.N. GAOR 51st Sess., at 18, U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.78
(1996)
9 In her report on the Eichmann Trial, Hanna Arendt notes in passing that Eichmann mentioned at times
that he would ‘like to make peace with his former enemies’, a sentiment that he shared with many ordinary
Germans and a sentiment that was behind proposals to create a ‘conciliation committee’ to bring together
Nazi murderers and Jewish survivors. She regarded such ideas as completely fantastic and utterly devoid of
reality, serving only to give ‘an extraordinary sense of elation’ to the speaker, as they embarked on this gross
adventure in self-deception. H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem : A Report on the Banality of Evil, Penguin
Classics, London 2006.
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Most reasonably informed people above a certain age have a general idea of what happened
in Rwanda in 1994. In that year the hitherto obscure (to a Western audience) African
country exploded into the global newswith graphic and terrible reports of themassmurder
ofmen, women and children of one ethnicity by themen, women and children of another.
The reports were often so horrific as to be practically unbelievable; detailing the torture
and slaughter of thousands upon thousands by neighbours armed with crude machetes
and farming instruments. Many people will remember that the UN forces present at the
time were largely pulled out rather than engaged to try to stop the carnage.10 As time went
on and more diverse reports of the situation emerged, it became more difficult to grasp a
simple version of what was going on, and this became even more the case as the genocide
gave way to a massive humanitarian refugee crisis as displaced Rwandans flooded into
disease ridden camps along the border with Congo and Tanzania and reports emerged of
thousands of deaths from preventable diseases such as typhoid and cholera. The displaced
people were Rwandan Hutus, while the genocidal campaign had been conducted against
Tutsis. The attention paid to the refugee crisis arguably deflected attention from the
aftermath of the genocide, in particular the plight of the survivors. The international
community, it seemed, was much more ready to intervene to provide humanitarian aid
relief than to intervene militarily at an earlier stage when the genocide itself might have
been averted and this non-political politics has been the subject of much debate.11 As is
the way of things, new global calamities came to grab the headlines and to divert attention
from Rwanda and the aftermath to the genocide, and public media reports were replaced
gradually by a mass of more considered literature trying to make sense of that period.12
The attention of theUNwas not so easily diverted. It had been the object of heavy criticism
not only from the media but also from many of its own members for its response to the
crisis in Rwanda. For example, Kofi Annan, in response to a deeply critical independent
report on the conduct of theUN in relation to the genocide –which he himself as Secretary
General commissioned – expressed publicly his deep remorse at theUN’s failure to prevent
or stop the genocides.13 Annan, at the time of the genocide, had been the UNHighOfficial
10 R. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, Arrow, London 2004.
11 See, for example, S. Žižek, ‘Against Human Rights’,New Left Review, Vol. 34, 2005; M. Mamdani, ‘The Pol-
itics of Naming’, London Review of Books, Vol. 29, No. 5, 2007.
12 G. Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide, Hurst, London 1997; A. Des Forges, Leave None to
Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch 1999; P. Gourevitch, We Wish To Inform You
That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families, Picador, London 2000; M. Mamdani,When Victims
Become Killers; Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton University Press, Princeton
2001; L. Melvern,Conspiracy toMurder: The Rwandan Genocide, Verso, London 2004; L. Melvern,A People
Betrayed; The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, Zed Books, London 2000.
13 See UN Security Council, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 15 December 1999.
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in charge of the Rwandanmission. In the autumn of 1994, just a fewmonths after themass
killings had stopped, authorized under UN Resolution 935, the UN sent in a team of
investigators to make an initial report on what had happened. The investigators found
that there was widespread evidence of a genocidal campaign against the ethnic Tutsis of
Rwanda, and evidence of the mass-killing of ethnic Hutus on the basis of their real or
supposed opposition to the exterminations, or because they weremistaken for Tutsis. The
report found that Tutsis had been targeted as a group, the Hutus as individuals. On the
basis of this report the UN concluded that genocide had occurred, and an International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was set up, through a similar ad-hoc process and along
similar lines to the recently established International Criminal Tribunal for Former-
Yugoslavia, to try those most responsible for the outrage. The ICTR was set up under the
mandate of UN Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994, in the preamble to which was stated:
‘Expressing once again its grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide and other
systematic, widespread, and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law have
been committed in Rwanda […’’.
The juridical response to trying those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda has come
in two forms; the domestic Rwandan response, based on the Rwanda legal system, and the
international response, based on International Law. Rwanda has adopted a twin-track
process for trying those accused of genocide. Those accused of the most serious crimes,
for example organizing and fomenting the original scheme are tried through a formal
court process and may be awarded prison sentences (up until the abolition of capital
punishment in 2007, the death penalty was also available and applied).14 Those accused of
more minor crimes, for example crimes against property, are tried through the gacaca
process,15 where local justices adjudicate through more informal processes and award
compensation or require imprisonment. The ICTR tries those that it regards as beingmost
seriously implicated in the genocide, and awards prison sentences up to a maximum of
life imprisonment. To some degree the functioning of both these structures of justice
complements each other. For example, the participation of the international community
under the auspices of the UN in the body of the ICTR carries sufficient weight to have
persuaded many countries throughout the world to extradite accused persons – amongst
whom were some of the chief architects of the genocide – who had fled into exile on their
territory after the genocide, something which the government of Rwanda was unable to
do. For example ex-primeminister Jean-Paul Kambanda was extradited to the ICTR from
Kenya in 1997 to face trial in Arusha and in 1998 became the first ever head of government
14 The abolition of the death penalty was undertaken in order to facilitate the eventual transfer of accused from
the ICTR, as part of the completion strategy, which the ICTRwould not countenancewhile the death penalty
stood.
15 To be discussed in further detail below.
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to be convicted of genocide. However, the ICTR could only ever be an instrument to
administer justice in relation to a very limited number of accused due to the complex and
expensive nature of its processes (some trials have now been running for more than five
years) so that the administration of justice in relation to the mass of those involved was
necessary as a feature of domestic Rwandan legality. Despite the seeming complementarity
of the processes, however, the initial support of the Rwandan government for an interna-
tional tribunal quickly gave way to an attitude of reservation as to the proposed form and
location of such a tribunal, and the relationship between the actual ICTR since its inception
and the Rwandan government has often deteriorated to something approaching mutual
hostility.16 There have been diverse reasons for this breakdown in relations, most notably
the Rwandan government’s ongoing annoyance that the massive expenditure disbursed
to fund the ICTRwas not allocated to reconstruction and reconciliation efforts on its own
soil, either as direct grant or by virtue of the Tribunal having its seat there. Beyondmatters
of resources there have been three chief objections by the Rwandan government to the
actual legal processes of the ICTR; the first is the notion that the formal criminal legal
structure as instituted places toomuch emphasis on the perpetrators rather than the victims,
the second that the maximum penalty for those found guilty did not extend to the death
penalty, and the third that at certain points the idea of trying members of the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (the invading ‘Tutsi army’ which militarily defeated the then Rwandan
government to end the genocide) for involvement in crimes against humanitywasmooted.17
The two different patterns of juridico-political response to the genocide exist, of course,
within two different worlds of possibility. The international response is a product of the
entire gamut of international structures that both compose and influence the conduct of
the UN, while the Rwandan response is entirely local and with regard for wider geo-
political or global developmental ideas only insofar as these are perceived to serve the
national interest at present – that national interest having to bend itself to the pressing
concerns of national reconciliation and reconstruction. And it is on this ground of ‘recon-
ciliation’ that the conceptual programmes of both the ICTR and theRwandan justice system
ostensibly find their commonground. This termhas gained particularly prominencewithin
international humanitarian thinking as a result of what seems the more or less successful
transition of South Africa away from the Apartheid regime to a multi-cultural democratic
polity, aided by the novel justice mechanism of a ‘truth and reconciliation commission’.
This is not the only arena inwhich ‘reconciliation’ has beenmobilized as a basic ideawithin
which justice processes should be organized, in obvious contrast tomore classical (Kantian)
ideas of justice mechanisms serving a higher form of ideal abstraction of itself; the purity
16 K. Moghalu, Rwanda’s Genocide: The Politics of Global Justice, Macmillan, London 2005.
17 Id., p. 125-153.
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of judgement and punishment in relation to the existential and deontological matter of
the crime. The reasons for the ascendancy of reconciliation are based in the marriage of
political uncertainty of both conceptual and practical hue.18 The conceptual uncertainty
that has taken hold of international systems of justice is everywhere evident, as to the value
of an over-riding Western notion of justice provision and justice mechanisms that gain
global prominence because of the historical and actual pre-eminence of Western nations
within international governmental and non-governmental agencies, but which are
increasingly conceded to be inappropriate for local circumstances in particular areas of
the world. In terms of practical politics the requirement for reconciliation in the wake of
situations of conflict is generally dictated by the fact that the foundational structure, the
nation-state, on which international relations is based cannot be regarded as a flexible
entity, so that there is generally no option but that the citizens of a territory that has gone
through conflict must somehow be reconciled to each other at least to the extent that they
can inhabit the same national territory. Whatever the efficaciousness of either the ICTR
or the Rwandan justice system in relation to the genocide, there is no doubt that they both
aim to facilitate reconciliation. The question opens up of what particular reconciliation is
being constituted in each site.19
The ICTR and Reconciliation
Political and social stabilization in Rwanda depends on whether all citizens,
regardless of their ethnic origin, can be reconciled. Such national reconciliation
would imply the due administration of justice, first of all to ensure that the
guilty parties no longer feel they can act with impunity, which would act as a
deterrent. Secondly, it would enable victims and their families to feel that justice
was being done and that the real perpetrators were being punished, which
would dampen any feelings of revenge. If justice is not done, there may be no
end to hatred, and atrocities could go on and on, with the executioners believing
they were immune to prosecution and the victims’ thirst for revenge fuelled
by a sense of injustice and the idea that an entire ethnic group was responsible
for the atrocities committed against them. In this regard it is of paramount
importance that justice be done, because this will help replace the idea of col-
lective political responsibilitywith the idea of individual criminal responsibility.
18 A. Schaap, Political Reconciliation, Routledge, London 2005.
19 For an introduction to the multiplicity and generality of debates on reconciliation see Schaap 2005 and S.
Veitch 2007.
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First ICTRPresident (Judge) Laity Kama, addressingU.N.GAOR, 51st Session:
5, U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.78 (1996)
It is a gauge of just how successful has the idea of reconciliation become in recent times
that in the quote given above from the (then) leading judge at the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, a court trying ‘an ideal type case of violations of international
criminal law’,20 justice, rather than simply proposed as good, correct and necessary in its
own right, is cast as a support player in relation to the leading role given to national recon-
ciliation. Criminal prosecutions are presented in quite classical legal terms as necessary to
guard against impunity and so to have a deterrent effect, but also are presented, in much
less classical terms, as necessary to serve the role of replacing ‘collective political responsi-
bility with individual criminal responsibility.’The role of the criminal law, in other words,
is explicitly cast as being less about punishing the guilty few because they are guilty, but
because by punishing the guilty few the implication is to recognize the innocence of the
many. Law is proposed as a vital vector instrument to provide an escape from a corrosive
politics and to ground a new future. Through this gesture themanywhomight have seemed
to bear some political responsibility because of some perhapsminimal involvement which
may have been thrust upon them – they, after all, escaped the violent maelstrom and also
failed to stop it – thus come to constitute a decontaminated political community, and we
might further say, translating a vocabulary of political responsibility into a more personal
language but without violence to ideas at play, is that an aspect of this decontamination is
to take away their shame.
Such emotional language does enter into the judge’s statement, but from another direction
and to another end. There are repeated references to the idea of ‘feelings’, in particular to
the feelings of the victims. The judge seems to be willing to ascribe to the court the
responsibility of ensuring not alone that justice be done, but also that the victims should
feel that justice has been done. This feeling of justice having been done is linked on one
side to the attribution of guilt to the responsible criminals, and on the other side to the
prospect of national reconciliation: the victims will feel that justice has been done if they
can come to understand that the responsibility lies not with an entire ethnic group but
with a small group of individuals, and when they come to this realization then they will
be in a position to reconcile with the innocentmajority as opposed to the ‘real perpetrators’.
This realization will be enough to diffuse the ‘thirst for revenge’ harboured by victims and
replace it with a sense of justice having been done. Once again law here is portrayed as the
purifier of politics, except this purification process is directed to the victims (rather than
20 D. Rothe & C.W. Mullins, Symbolic Gestures and the Generation of Global Social Control: The International
Criminal Court, Lexington Books, Lanham 2006, p. 5.
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those who might be thought politically responsible) and is directed forward in time, the
purging of feelings of revenge that they might carry forward, rather than the purging of,
for those potentially to be held politically responsible, the notion of previous culpability.
The law is a double filter of social process and social affect; it transforms perverse politics
into law, leaving the ground ready for a new politics, and it transforms grand negative
social emotions into positive emotions, leaving the ground ready for a new community.
The double sense of its operation is captured by the term ‘reconciliation’, a concept from
which the judge does not shy in the slightest.
A third element that undergirds those two already mentioned, and which has entered
obliquely into the discussions above, is that of time, or more precisely the relationship
between reconciliation and time. The law deals with the past and opens the way to the
future. In classical legal terms this two-directional quality is heavily biased towards an
attention on the past; the law deals with the past and there is an implicit assumption that
the future will take care of itself as a matter of society and politics. The statement from the
judge is a statement of recognition that the weight of attention has shifted much more
towards the future, to the idea of the importance of reconciliation in the grand scheme of
things and the relative putting in perspective of the past, that is, the crimes which have
been committed in the past. To the extent that the past has a value there is an inference
that it has a value in order to ground a positive future; the idea is re-conciliation, the pro-
jection backwards in time of a notion of concilarity, of being in council, in order to ground
the supernormative ‘reconciliation’. Politics in the sense of social practice is purified, pol-
itics in the sense of affect is purified, politics in the sense of previous structures of social
meaning is purified (through an imaginary projection of a natural order of ‘conciliation’
backwards and forwards in time). The law as simple process of adjudication, how could
it not in the face of such power, prostrates itself before reconciliation.
Such an attitude is not, of course, without its critics. Take, for example, the following:
Reconciliation has too often come to signify in the political discourse of our
times the call not just to put the trauma’s of the past behind us but also, in a
sense, to put behind us the very politics of the past. Against this our main
concern has been to emphasise that ‘reparation of historical injustices’ requires
that we face up to these injustices. That is what it means to do justice to them
and reconciliation can only, properly, be the contingent response, not the
unconditional outcome, of how societies face up to precisely that task.21
21 Christodoulidis and Veitch 2007, p. 1.
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This marks out distinctly a latent theoretical danger of the kind of instrumentalization of
(criminal) justice in relation to a projected future that lies at the heart of the discussion in
the text above: namely that past injustices of a political nature by their conversion into
tamer legal problems are swept under a carpet rather than resolved.What if, in other words
and to respond directly to the quotation from Judge Laity Kama, the more true pattern of
the past has been precisely ‘collective political responsibility’ for massive crimes against
humanity, and the transference of criminal responsibility to the few in the service of rec-
onciliation is an instance of over-determining an outcome which flies in the face of justice
in a broader sense than that narrowly encompassed by criminal notions of intent and guilt?
In this reading the new ‘decontaminated’ political community envisaged by the judge takes
the paradoxical form of a legally constituted non-political political community, in the
sense of a political community which must forget the conditions of its own coming into
being in accepting the status of tabula rasa. Furthermore, the deep imbrications of law
within politics, even if the particular events seem to warrant a generous and helpful inter-
vention, has perhaps the effect of destroying the most valuable qualities of law as standing
above a fray and adjudicating from a point of objectivity. The idea that the law must find
people criminally responsible in order to create a political effect takes on a pattern of cir-
cularity; if the legal process has been set up on the basis that genocide occurred and the
criminal law of genocide presumes an intent to commit genocide, and the future good of
the political community requires reconciliation, and reconciliation requires the translation
of ideas of political responsibility to those of individual criminal responsibility, and the
court recognizes its own function as providing reconciliation, then the legal process will
find that genocide has occurred and it will find individuals who will fulfil the conditions
to be convicted of it.
But perhaps it is unwise to treat this matter too categorically, in the sense of assuming that
perceived paradoxes of logic and circularities of argument are enough to ground funda-
mental objections. The judge’s statement under examination is an extract from a speech
by a lawyer (the chief lawyer) from the ICTR and certainly made various claims about the
legal process, but it was made to the General Assembly of the United Nations, and thus
perhaps it was not only fitting that the speech should have blurred the boundaries between
politics and law, but also that a certain amount of rhetorical excess might have been
expected. Furthermore, as is well known and frequently acknowledged, the nature of
international law in its current course of development is still such that its nature as law
(with expected ‘rule of law’ characteristics of clarity and consistency of operation) is fre-
109
Reconciling Rwandan Reconciliations:
quently called into question, and its close links to politics are frequently and unavoidably
apparent.22
Finally, one might well claim that the focus on reconciliation as prior to (in importance)
and post (in time) legal process creates a field of considerations (conceptual, practical,
temporal) that is appropriate to the subject matter and in its complexities and paradoxes
appropriately recalls profound theorization around questions of justice, rather than pre-
sumes justice as a simple function of law.23 In this light one might say that the ICTR, and
legal processes like it which self-consciously span the boundary of law and politics, are in
a sense rescuing law (or attempting to do so) from a frequently perceived – and perhaps
characteristically Modern – sterility,24 to return to paying attention to considerations of
justice (including affect25) that are, after all, the raison d’etre of law.
Adopting a slightly different vocabulary we might say that on certain liminal occasions
law and politics approach each other to constitute ‘transitional justice’ which as a term is
perhaps rescued from accusations of being either self-contradictory (logically paradoxical)
or axiomatic (logically circular) by its usual modest employment as a rough and ready
generic term to cover transition to liberal democracy, the deeper theorization of which
(along with more profound questions of justice) is usually bracketed out.26 Such a transi-
tional justice optic through such a bracketing out or assumption of the basic ameliorative
qualities of rule of law/democracy, open an opportunity for more detailed attention to the
‘constructivist’ qualities of legal process.27 That is to say, what forward directed social effect
is produced by the operation of diverse ostensibly legal processes, even if these processes
recognizably do not contain all the elements that they would within a settled sphere of the
operation of normal democratic politics. In this light statements and attitudes such as
those quoted from Judge Laity Kama andKofi Annan, which highlight the role of the ICTR
22 See Rothe & Mullins 2006; and, in particular, Mullins & Rothe 2008, for discussion and bibliography. See
also K. Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crimes Trials, Prager, New York 2006. For further dis-
cussion, see P. Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Law and Societal Memory’, inVeitch 2007. For comparison, see
R. Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia : An Exercise in Law, Politics and
Diplomacy, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004.
23 See, paradigmatically, J. Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’, in Gil Anidjar
(Ed.), Acts of Religion, Routledge, New York/London 2002.
24 C. Douzinas, The End of Human Rights, Hart, Oxford, 2000; S. Motha ‘Reconciliation as Domination’, in
Veitch 2007.
25 P. Goodrich, Languages of Law, Weidenfeld Paperbacks, London 1990.
26 R. Teitel, Transitional Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000; C. Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace
Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008; C. Bell, ‘Transitional Justice,
Interdisciplinarity, and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’, International Journal of Transitional Justice,
Vol. 3, 2009, p. 5-27.
27 Teitel 2000.
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in furthering reconciliation, could well be regarded as legitimate in that they are not
descriptive but performative; connecting reconciliation to criminal justice as a means to
promote this as an idea not to make verifiable claims as to its truth. To push this idea a
little further one might recognize the parameters of the acknowledged force of law as
connected not just to physical force, but to its symbolic power, this power in itself having
somequalities of themystical, in otherwords to remark that the repetition of ‘reconciliation’
is more than performative in a secular sense, but also performative in a more basic sacred
sense, it is incantatory to an idea of reconciliation in the sense of reaching out for shared
humanity. The reconciliation in question, in other words, is also that between the global
community and the Rwandan victims, an acknowledgement of a deep sense that the court
process constitutes a species of atonement for (a general political) shameful abandonment.28
The legal process is a formal prayer to justice, not its accomplishment.
Reconciliation and Rwanda
Reconciliation is not just one of the many other options for us Rwandese, it is
rather a non-negotiable obligation. An obligation to give ourselves hope for
our old age; an obligation to leave to our children a better Rwanda to grow and
live in. Statement from Antoine Rutayisire, Vice-President of the Rwandan
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, on the NURC website
On 1 October 2010 the UN released the official version of its ‘Report of the Mapping
Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committedwithin the territory of theDemocratic Republic of the Congo
between March 1993 and June 2003’. The Report, widely leaked in advance of its official
release, accused the RPA, the Rwandan Army, of having committed numerous crimes
against humanity in the course of its pursuit of ethnic Hutus who had refused repatriation
into Rwanda during the RPA incursions into DRC in 1996-7, ostensibly carried out with
a view to closing refugee camps which had become bases for hostile attacks on Rwanda.
Such crimes against humanity were alleged to have included activities that could, if fully
investigated and confirmed under more stringent evidential requirements, constitute acts
of genocide. The impact of the report, and perhaps even more so of the numerous leaks
of the draft report, was profound. President Paul Kagame made a speech to the General
Assembly of the UN in which he condemned the draft report, protesting that:
28 N. McMillan, ‘“Our” Shame: International Responsibility for the Rwandan Genocide’, The Australian Fem-
inist Law Journal, Vol. 28, 2008, p. 3-29.
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‘it has become clear that the UN has evolved into a two-tier organization,
reflecting a world that seems to be divided into twomajor categories: one with
inherent laudable values, rights and liberties, and another that needs to be
taught and coached on these values.’29
ForeignMinister LouiseMushikiwabo rubbished the report as ‘flawed and dangerous from
start to finish’, ‘a moral and intellectual failure as well as an insult to history’, and ‘a threat
to regional stability’30 and threatened to withdraw Rwandan troops from their roles in UN
international peace-keeping missions, including in the Sudan where the majority of the
UN force and the force commander were Rwandese. Further developments in the shape
of an International Tribunal to investigate further the issues raised, or recommendations
for criminal prosecutions through the ICC or some ad-hoc process are to be expected
(although note there that Rwanda is not a signatory to governing protocols of the ICC and
thus not subject to its jurisdiction).
While any state might be expected to react angrily to allegations that its forces had been
involved in crimes against humanity up to and including genocide, the allegations, and
the reason why the foreign minister could refer to the report as an ‘insult to history’ were
particularly galling and worrying to the Rwandan government in that its own version of
history is that it managed to stop a genocide when the international community stood idly
by, and that, furthermore, it was forced into its excursions into the DRC because of the
inactivity of theUN to protect Rwanda from further aggression from genocidal forces even
in the wake of all that happened in 1994. The international prestige of the Rwandan gov-
ernment, and the internal legitimacy of its governance has relied heavily on this version
of events, in the face of periodic but persistent claims (and the power interests here are
clear) that the situation in Rwanda in 1994 was not as black and white as it has been pre-
sented, and that, in fact, could more accurately be portrayed as a situation of mass civil
strife with random atrocities on all sides and, to the extent that there was planning of
genocide, that what occurred was a ‘double genocide’ of fanatical extremist Hutus against
Tutsi, but also of RPA Tutsi military against Hutu civilians. The allegation of potential
acts of genocide in the Congo therefore has a much deeper resonance with internal issues
of legitimacy in Rwanda itself.
These issues of legitimate governance are particularly sensitive for theRwandan government
because of the policies that it has put in place to reconstruct the country in the aftermath
of the genocide. The policy of ‘National Unity and Reconciliation’ put in place in 1999
29 Speech to the General Assembly, 24 September 2010.
30 Quoted in C. McGreal, ‘Delayed UN Report Links Rwanda to Congo Genocide’,Guardian, 1 October 2010.
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and confirmed by the Rwandan constitution in 2003 in effect delegitimizes (and this has
been instituted into various legalmeasures against ‘divisionism’) the idea of ethnic identity
in favour of the strong promotion of national identity, predicated on the promotion of an
accordant national historical narrative of relatively benign pre-colonial conditions that
were corrupted and racialized by colonial intervention to the extent that the conditions
for genocide were sown years in advance and subsequently aggravated by various extreme
material conditions on the ground; unemployment, poverty, mis-governance, malign
foreign interventions.31 The issue of the framing of the historical narrative of the most
recent UN report is then also an issue, in that it fails to acknowledge what the Rwandan
government has promoted as its core story of responsibility; that of the colonial powers,
chief amongst which form the core membership of the UN Security Council. In adopting
such a strong historical narrative the Rwandan government has drawn the implication
that the narrative of the future must be equally strictly controlled, hence the authoritarian
attitudes towards what are regarded as ‘revisionist’ tendencies, chiefly either a questioning
of the core story of the genocide, which, while attaching immediate responsibility to Hutu
genocidaires, does contain themitigating elements for the Rwandan population as a whole
of attaching overall historical responsibility to colonial powers (both in terms of immiser-
ation of Rwanda and of the inculcation of destructive oppositional identity patterns along
a ‘divide and rule’ axis, both sides of which were subjugated to dominant white colonial
power). The categories of Hutu and Tutsi are, in current legislation, abolished, not just as
a matter of formal identification through state bodies, but also as a matter of public dis-
course and political representation, to the extent that any such public or political discourse
might be legally judged to have ‘divisionist’ effect and to result in criminal prosecution
and stiff penalties.32 In practical terms, it is often alleged, what this means is that an
ostensibly democratic government is in fact an elite clientelist Tutsi authoritarianplutocracy,
centred around the charismatic President Paul Kagame, leader of the invading Tutsi forces
into Rwanda at the time of the genocide and since then two-term President, on the most
recent occasion ostensibly elected with over 90% of the popular vote – a noted and active
proponent of this theory is Paul Rusesabagina, hero of the popular fact-based film ‘Hotel
Rwanda’.33 The shield that the Rwandan government uses against such attacks is themoral
authority it has garnered through its having stopped the 1994 genocide, and the idea that
such measures which may seem to have an authoritarian tang of suppressing freedom of
31 S. Buckley-Zistel, ‘Nation, Narration, Unification? The Politics of History Teaching After the Rwandan
Genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2009, p. 31-53.
32 E. Zorbas, ‘What Does Reconciliation After Genocide Mean? Public Transcripts and Hidden Transcripts in
Post-Genocide Rwanda’, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2009, p. 127-147.
33 I am grateful to Nesam McMillan for pointing out the irony that both Kagame and Rusesabagina are feted
as heroes in theWest, with little or no acknowledgement of their incompatible historical and political anal-
yses and visions of the future.
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thought and expression, are in fact entirely necessary as an accelerated programme of re-
education that is up against the clock of potential re-lapse back into an available, deep-
rooted through colonial imposition, pattern of ethnic division,mutual hatred and violence.
The idea that they were themselves responsible for genocide calls all this structure of
legitimation into question,melts it down into a relativist ‘two sides to every story’ quagmire.
That is no basis on which to build a future.
The institutional structures which have been set up in Rwanda to counter the potential of
a relapse intowhat it would regard as negative and incorrect understanding of the genocide
both in its immediate operation and in its historical (determining) context and which are
most generalized in the country, are the gacaca legal process and the ingando re-education
process. Each of these processes finds an antecedent in the pre-colonial history of Rwanda.
The former is a community legal process adjudicated by trained local personnel who take
the role of the ‘elders’ in more traditional practice and who pass judgement on the less
serious cases in relation to genocide, passing sentence that may run to incarceration but
whichmay also be limited to or include reparation or community or victimorientedwork.34
The focus is not alone on the passing of judgement, but on the opening up of a public
forum for the expression of public accounts of what happened, and of instituting a space
where there is a sense of community involvement in the provision of justice and therefore
of opening a space for a shared reconciliation. The degree towhich this functions efficiently
is highly contested, and there are obvious plausible difficulties even from a theoretical
point of view in that many victims are dead and so there may be few available witnesses
to particular events, thewitnessesmay feel intimidated from speaking, opportunistsmight
take the chance to accuse innocent peoplewith a view to gaining someunwarranted revenge
or personal advantage and so forth.35 Nevertheless, the attempt is to create this process as
a site for reconciliation through general expression and coming to terms with truth as
personal testimony as well as with the truth of the eventual result. Ingando is a mass re-
education process, originally conceived as a tool specifically for former combatants and
released prisoners (of whom at one stage there were well over 100,000 imprisoned in
relation to genocide crimes) but which has been broadened into amuchmore comprehen-
sive civics programme for genocide survivors, community leaders, university students,
women’s groups and youth groups. Topics are covered under five central themes: analysis
of Rwanda’s problems; history of Rwanda; political and socioeconomic issues in Rwanda;
Africa, rights, obligations and duties; leadership.
34 P. Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 2010; D. Temple-Raston, Justice on the Grass, Free Press, New York 2005.
35 Clark 2010; Temple-Raston 2005; Buckley-Zistel 2009; Zorbas 2009.
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What is evident in the two institutions described briefly above is that there is a coherent
promulgation of the core narrative of the fundamental danger of ethnic divisionism, the
roots of such divisionism in the colonial period, and the remedy for such divisionism in
the recovery of a more pure pre-colonial period of community relative harmony which
can be brought up to date and used to invigorate a sense of common Rwandan identity.
The contrast with the implicit and sometimes explicit understandings which ground the
ICTR process is very distinct. For the ICTR the route to reconciliation is to transform
collective political responsibility into individual criminal responsibility. For the Rwandan
government there is no question but that there was collective political responsibility and
mass participation. However, the roots of this political responsibility are located in a per-
verse Rwandan sociality that itself was the result of the colonial period. The prosecution
and conviction of those considered most responsible in the sense of having positions of
leadership and responsibility or having participated actively inmurder is amatter of justice
andnot particularly related to reconciliation.The contemporarily innovative but historically
based community restorative and mass education programmes of gacaca and ingando are
designed to construct and promote a strong national narrative, a shared sense of history,
a plausible responsible ‘Other’ that displaces the potential re-emergence of Tutsi-Hutu
rivalry and conflict and a sense of shared future on the basis of common understanding
of the past.
This programmeof reconciliation is itself situatedwithin awider social project of economic
development along the pattern of standard indices of development; health, education,
infrastructural development, sanitation, transport, good governance. In 2000 the Rwandan
government released its ‘Vision 2020’document, including a forewordbyPresidentKagame
in which he stated:
The Vision 2020 is a reflection of our aspiration and determination as Rwan-
dans, to construct a united, democratic and inclusive Rwandan identity, after
so many years of authoritarian and exclusivist dispensation. We aim, through
this Vision, to transform our country into a middle- income nation in which
Rwandans are healthier, educated and generallymore prosperous. The Rwanda
we seek is one that is united and competitive both regionally and globally.
To achieve this, the Vision 2020 identifies six interwoven pillars, including
good governance and efficient State, skilled human capital, vibrant private
sector, world-class physical infrastructure andmodern agriculture and livestock,
all geared towards national, regional and global markets.
This document has been followed up by series of detailed policy documents and pro-
grammes which pursue the market based development principles laid out in Vision 2020,
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the latest of which is the ‘Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2008-
2012’ document of 2007which charts the progress up to that point and lays out the pathway
for projected future development. This is not the time and place for an assessment of the
plausibility of the projections in this and similar documents, but simply an occasion to
remark that the Rwandan government explicitly models Rwandan development on Asian
tiger economic development and seeks the transformation of the Rwandan economy from
a subsistence agrarian economy to a ‘knowledge-based’ ‘middle-income’ economy by the
year 2020. It recognizes the absolute necessity of suchdevelopment given that the population
is projected to double from eight to sixteen million people by then, and given that the lack
of resources has been acknowledged as a co-factor in the development of the genocide. In
other words, the Rwandan government seems clear-eyed about the very serious social
trouble that lies ahead if there is not sufficient economic development. The very clear sub-
text to many documents such as the two mentioned is that reconciliatory practices have
to be read in the context of this most basic of objectives, hence the extremely hard line on
what might be regarded as ‘divisionist’ in the sense of creating obstacles to a unified pop-
ulation working to progress economically with a shared understanding of past and
potential (brighter) future.
Conclusion
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda delivered the first ever judg-
ment on the crime of genocide by an international court. This judgment is a
testament to our collective determination to confront the heinous crime of
genocide in a way that we never have before. I am sure that I speak for the
entire international community when I express the hope that this judgment
will contribute to the long term process of national reconciliation in Rwanda.
For there can be no healingwithout peace; there can be no peacewithout justice;
and there can be no justice without respect for human rights and the rule of
law.
Kofi Annan, preamble message to ICTR document, Challenging Impunity
The ICTR, which began operating in 1997, is still on-going, although subsequent events
elsewhere guarantee that it has a low profile in global news coverage. To date forty nine
people have been tried to completion at first instance, with forty one of those having been
found guilty of crimes of genocide and/or crimes against humanity, of whom nine are
currently pursuing appeals. Eight people have been acquitted. Twenty cases are currently
in progress and two people are detained awaiting trial. Ten named accused are still at
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large.36 A ‘completion strategy’ for the Tribunal has been finalized, which envisages the
possible end of trials in Arusha by the end of 2011, and the subsequent timely completion
of any appeals processes (heard in The Hague). This is undoubtedly a rather slender tally
of results in relation to an event of genocide wherein the estimates as to those killed gener-
ally vary between half a million to one million people. The legitimation of such a paucity
of trials, as discussed above, is that only those considered prima facie most responsible
and who have escaped the jurisdiction of Rwanda are indicted at the ICTR, and that the
ICTR must be understood as complementary to the domestic Rwandan justice system in
producing an adequate overall justice process. This essay has focused on the somewhat
confusing further attempts to go beyond the legitimation of the ICTR on the grounds of
justice considerations in relation to heinous crimes and further legitimation on the grounds
of a contribution to an undoubtedly desirable outcome, some form of ‘reconciliation’ for
Rwanda itself, with all due caution to the flexibility of such a concept. The claims as to this
further contribution to Rwandan reconciliation rest, as discussed above, on a notion of
the symbolic power of the law in a transitional context to create reconciliation by virtue
of the repeated annunciation of the same, a form of exemplary justice, and a recognition
that the legal process is part of a larger social imperative. However, as this essay has gone
on to detail, the symbolic power of law in this context is reliant on its ability to convert
mass political responsibility into individual criminal responsibility. This is a conversion
process which is directly counter to the reconciliation paradigm which operates inside
Rwanda itself, where the story is of mass political responsibility where ultimately such
responsibility comes to rest with the structuring force of colonial relations. To read this
contrast in another direction, the claim can be made that the translation by the ICTR of
political responsibility to criminal responsibility is the structural feature of the court itself
which has the effect of pre-absolving colonial political structures from any consideration
as potentially culpable (and potentially neo-colonial persistent structures and even persons)
in favour of making sure that guilt will be located within Rwandan itself and a limited
group of people at that. The incapacity of the legal forum to attend to wider notions than
individual criminal intent serves as an insulation from consideration as pernicious to the
very features on which the Rwandan government focuses its attention as the root of the
genocide.
Putting this argument bluntly, it is that the legal institution itself, whatever the outcome
of the trials, displays, reproduces and rests on a structure of ideas, a political form, that is
closely related to the structure of the long term colonial relations between Rwanda and
the colonizing Western powers and which persists in the post-genocide period. In this
reading the attitude displayed by Judge Laity Kama in the quotation on page nine above
36 Accurate as of 1 June 2011. For up-to-date information see <www.unictr.org/Cases>.
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is approved to the extent that the court is recognized as not principally a legal institution,
but rather an exhibition of a deep political structure which happens to take the form of a
court, although the political quality of the court is read in much more negative fashion
than the interpretation offered by the judge. The political structure is that which seems to
be given as a gift or paid as a debt due, actually operates as a gift to self. Specifically in
relation to the ICTR, the gift of the international community to the Rwanda people in
recognition of their loss and its own inability to act sooner, is the gift of a kind of mirror
within which theWest finds its own returned humanity. The ICTR acts as ‘the conscience
of the international community’.37 It did not act in time to stop the genocide but has the
ability to destroy the impunity of the responsible and so to contribute to reconciliation.
Except that the structures ofmeaningwithinwhich it wants to frame the genocide in order
to make this gift, have the effect of directly countering the basic narrative of responsibility
on which the Rwandan government has based its entire programme of reconciliation.
Reconciliation for Rwanda is nominally a principal goal of the ICTR, but is structurally
secondary to theWest’s reconciliation with its own sense of itself as benign, a sense of self
which allows to emerge intact an idea of genocide, of the Rwandan genocide, as having its
roots in the evil conduct of a limited cohort of Rwandan citizens. Whatever the questions
which hang over the good faith and good conduct of the Rwandan government in regards
the issue of reconciliation, it is important that the structural inadequacies of theUN justice
response through the ICTR should not be allowed to be hidden by the idea that domestic
criminal processes can be translated onto a transnational sphere and somehow become in
politics but not of it. This clumsy translation can only function to let the International
Community see what it wants to see, itself staring back in pious self-satisfaction.
37 Id.
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